Thursday, March 26, 2015

Cases from March 20, 2015

Cases from March 20, 2015

Welcome back readers and fellow litigators!  After last week’s marathon of a blog, I’m pumped up and ready to dig into all of the cases the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals decided this week!  …  Okay, so there’s only four cases, and only one of which is a criminal case…well, good, I needed a short post I guess.

Cases this week:

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Appellant Norvelle McIntire appealed after being convicted by a jury of Rape, Gross Sexual Imposition, Importuning, Attempted Gross Sexual Imposition, and Public Indecency in July of 2013.

By way of background, the accusations from the State were for three incidents; 1) touching the buttocks of two girls (one 12, one 14), 2) exposing himself and trying to force the 14 year old to touch his penis, and 3) pinning the 12 year old down and digitally penetrating her.

Specifically, the third incident happened, but only months later did the child come forward and told her cousin what had happened.  That information reached her parents and they took her to the hospital.  It was too late to find any physical evidence, but the hospital contacted the police anyway.

Appellant argued the following assignments of error:
1) The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Detective Fulton to provide inadmissable [sic] testimony regarding generalities about sex abuse victims[.]
2) The trial court erred when it allowed the state of Ohio to comment on appellant’s right to invoke counsel in violation of the fifth and sixth amendments to the federal constitution made applicable to the states by the fourteenth[.]
3) The trial court erred when it failed to grant the appellant’s motion for acquittal as it relates to count three in the indictment[.]

So, the first argument is that the Trial Court erred in allowed Sergeant Fulton to testify about why it’s not uncommon for victims of sexual assault, specifically child victims, to delay in reporting the crimes committed against them.  Appellant argued that allowing this testimony, the State was allowed to bolster the victim’s credibility and present “expert” testimony without declaring Sergeant Fulton to be an expert.

The Court, however, has found numerous times that a police officer with his experience and training, had the specialized knowledge required to testify concerning the incidence of delayed reporting by sexual abuse victims, even where the Trial Court had not specifically found the officer to be an “expert.”  The Court reached the same conclusion in this case.

Generally, a witness bay not provide opinion testimony regarding the truth of a witness’s statement or testimony, as that is the job of the trier of fact (aka: the jury, or the judge in a bench trial).  However, the Court found that Sergeant Fulton’s testimony was limited to his observations of the victim’s demeanor, his reasons for believing why she was initially holding back information, and that it wasn’t uncommon for that to happen.  Since he made no reference to his opinion if the victim was being truthful or not, the Court found that this was not error, and found Appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.

During a police interview, it was revealed to Appellant that he was going to be indicted for rape.  Appellant laughed and then said he would answer no more questions without his lawyer present.  This was testified to at trial over Appellant’s objection.

Prosecutors are not allowed to comment on post-arrest silence.  However, when a prosecutor DOES improperly reference said silence, the reviewing court must look to whether the comment was extensive, whether an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to the jury as a basis of conviction, and whether there is evidence that could have supported acquittal.  If the reference is brief, isolated, and followed by an instruction to the jury to disregard the statement, the error might not be reversible.

The State tried to argue that it was Appellant who did not remain silent after he was read his rights.  The Court, however, was not convinced that a laugh provided the State with an acceptable reason for commenting of Appellant’s invocation of his right to silence.  However, despite finding that, the Court did not believe this was reversible error.

There was a slightly interesting bit about the date of the incident.  The indictment stated that one of the offences happened “on” August 27, 2012, instead of the normal “on or about,” and the evidence showed that the offense happened earlier than that, but the time and date of an offense is ordinarily not a required element of an indictment, and is not necessary for the State to prove with specificity. 

The Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions.

Comments: Seems like a case with some very difficult facts.  These kind of criminal cases are always difficult to read through.  Without knowing what is on the record though, it’s hard to say much about this kind of case.

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Private custody case, Appellee father vs. Appellant mother.

Appellant argued the following assignments of error:
1) The magistrate failed to make the necessary finding as to whether the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change of environment to the child.
2) The magistrate’s finding that a change of custody was in the best interest of the child was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
3) The trial court erred in overruling mother’s objections to magistrate’s decision by employing the wrong standard of review.

Result: Affirmed

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Mortgage case

Appellants Pro Se argued the following assignment of error:
2) “The Court finds that the plaintiff has filed a motion for Summary Judgment supported by a Memorandum and Affidavit. Upon consideration thereof, the Court finds no genuine issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to a Judgment and Decree in Foreclosure as a matter of law.
This is in Error, There was no Notice served upon Appellants for Hearing on the Motion for summary judgment. This same motion has no evidence or affidavit attached to support plaintiff’s assertions Pursuant to Civil Rule 56(C). Appellee’s lack Standing to sue as they have no competent fact witness and were not holders of the Note at time of filing Complaint, Trial court abused its discretion and was without subject matter jurisdiction to rule in favor of Appellee’s (sic).”

The “2” is not a typo.  They originally stated two assignments of error, however, the first one was struck because Appellants filed the appeal on behalf of other people, constituting the unauthorized practice of law, and dismissed it from the case.

Result: Affirmed

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Civil case involving trusts

Assignments of error:
1) The trial court improperly ruled that plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action of breach of fiduciary duty against defendant.

Result: Affirmed

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Short week.  See you next time!

Thursday, March 19, 2015

Cases from March 13, 2015 (AND FORMAT CHANGE)

Cases from March 13 & 16, 2015

Welcome back readers and fellow litigators!  I was away on vacation over the weekend, so this blog is a little late.  This week, for some reason the Sixth District released a single decision on Monday, March 16.  It also released 18 other decisions on Friday, the 13th.  …oy…well, let’s not waste any time, shall we?

FORMAT CHANGE: So, as I was writing this entry, I came to a decision. I’m kind of waiving the white flag here.  I can’t do all of these cases.  So I’m going to do what I do best; pretend Civil Law doesn’t exist.  …okay, I’m half kidding.  What I mean is, I’m going to focus much more on the criminal cases.  For the Civil cases, I’m going to simply list their assignments of error and the outcome, and comment on anything I find interesting.  Otherwise I’m going to try to keep the same format for the criminal cases I have.


Cases this week:
4.       In Re O.S. – F-14-012

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Appellant Billy Jones appeals his sentence after pleading to a minor misdemeanor.

Appellant argued the following assignments of error:
1) A trial court errs, and does not have jurisdiction or authority to order forty hours of community service for a minor misdemeanor when R.C. 2929.27(D) only allows for thirty hours of community service.
2) A trial court errs, and does not have jurisdiction or authority to order community service unless it does so in lieu of all or party [sic] of the fine pursuant to R.C. 2927(D) [sic].

There’s no reason to get into the facts of this case.  Basically, the Trial Court ordered Appellant to 40 hours of community service.  It can’t do that because the maximum is 30 hours.  Also, a Trial Court can only order community service in lieu of paying a fine and not because it just wanted to impose community service.

The Court reversed Appellant’s sentence and remanded for the Trial Court to resentence Appellant and specify what part of a fine it was imposing the community service hours in lieu of.

Comments: Another case of a municipal court just doing whatever it wants to do.  My guess is that hardly anyone ever appeals anything like this, so those courts just get comfortable doing whatever the heck they want to do.

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This is a foreclosure action in which the Trial Court denied Appellant Vicki Rosin’s motion for relief from judgment.  …joy…

Appellant’s mortgage was recorded in 2004.  In 2010, Appellant fell behind in her monthly payments.  The Trial Court ordered foreclosure on the property in 2011.  This was not appealed.

Appellee purchased the property through sheriff’s sale 4 months later.  A month after that, Appellant filed a motion for relief from judgment under Ohio Civ.R.60(B).  The Trial Court denied this motion without explanation. 

Appellant appealed, arguing the following assignment of error:
1) The trial court erred in granting judgment to Plaintiff.

In order to obtain relief from judgment, a party must show that they: 1) have a meritorious defense if the relief is granted 2) the party is entitled to relieve under one of the grounds under Civ.R.60(B)(1-5), and 3) the motion is made within a reasonable time.

In a nutshell, the Court found no meritorious defense was apparent from the record, that Appellant was not entitled to relief because she could not show that Appellee used fraud to obtain the original judgment nor that she was prevented from arguing such to the Trial Court during the actual case due to Appellee’s alleged fraud, and that a six month delay in filing the motion in this case was unreasonable due to the facts of the case.

Comments: Running theme of this blog: I hate Mortgage cases…there might actually be something here worth discussing, but heck if I can find it…

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Assignment of error:
1) The trial court erred as a matter of law when it ruled the pre-existing artisan[s] lien did not have priority over a subsequently created statutory lien.

Result: Affirmed

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Appellant filed a “motion to intervene and return the minor child to the biological mother.”  The Trial Court, the juvenile court, dismissed saying it lacked jurisdiction as the Probate Court has jurisdiction under R.C.2101.24(A)(1)(e) to appoint and remove guardians.

The Court agreed and affirmed. 

There’s also a host of reasons this motion was dismissed, but finding the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the rest of the appeal was rendered moot.

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Assignments of error:
1) The probate court erred and abused its’ [sic] discretion when it denied the motion of sole hear [sic] Duane J. Tillimon to be appointed special administrator for the purpose of bringing a wrongful death lawsuit in the name of administrator Douglas A. Taylor.
2) The probate court erred and abused its’ [sic] discretion when it denied the motion of Duane J. Tillimon to deny payment of fees and commissions to guardian attorney Edward j. Fischer, guardian attorney Edward j. Fischer’s personal attorney John R. Wanick, and administrator attorney Douglas a. Taylor because they all failed in their legal obligations and duties to deceased ward Irene T. Tillimon.

Result: Affirmed

Comment: This case is from 2008.  It was stayed pending the outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding.  No one told the Court the bankruptcy ended in 2011.  Whoops…

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Appellant Kevin Smith appealed the denial of his “Motion to Vacate Void Judicial Sanction.”  Appellant was improperly sentenced to 919 days as a sanction for violating Post-Release Control consecutive to his 9 year sentence for Felonious Assault.  Ten years later, Appellant challenged the ability of the Trial Court to order the extra Post-Release Control sanction since he was not informed of the penalties of violating PRC in his prior felony conviction.  The Trial Court agreed and amended the order (Nunc Pro Tunc), removing any and all mention of the 919 day sanction.

Appellant Appealed.

Finding the Trial Court had already given Appellant his relief, the Court affirmed the Trial Court’s action.

Comments: I…don’t quite understand the timeline here, and I don’t have the time to go back and really check…but I have no idea what this person was going for if he was seriously released and THEN appealed…

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Assignment of error:
1) The Probate Court erred in granting defendant Mark Ott’s Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and denying plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

Result: Affirmed

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Appellant Robert Hensley appealed the Trial Court’s revocation of his Community Control (AKA: Probation for Felonies in Ohio) and sentencing him to five year incarceration.

This is an Anders Brief, which after reading the above line, surprised me as much as something that isn’t surprising in the least bit.

Appointed Counsel proposed the following Assignments of Error:
1) Appellant was denied his fourteenth amendment right to due process when the trial court revoked his probation.
2) The trial court abused its discretion when imposing sentence upon defendant.

Appellant admitted being in violation of his community control.  Appellant’s juvenile record was three and a half pages long comprised mostly of drug and theft related offenses.

The Court found no arguments of merit and affirmed.

Comments: Ahhh Anders…I hate you and yet I understand you…

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Appellant Gary Myers appealed his 17 month prison sentence after entering a guilty plea to one count of Pandering Sexually Oriented Material Involving a Minor, a felony of the fourth degree.  The charges came after it was discovered that Appellant was in possession of “copious amounts” of child porn.

Appellant argued the following assignments of errors:
1) The trial court erred in imposing a seventeen (17) month sentence upon defendant-appellant in that It did not comply with the requirements of Ohio Revised code sections 2929.11 et seq and by doing so, violated defendant-appellant’s right to due process.
2) The trial court abused its discretion in imposing a seventeen (17) month sentence upon defendant-appellant as it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant’s conviction was a sex offense and within the statutory range of a felony of the forth degree (6 – 18 months) so therefore the sentence was not contrary to law.

Also, the Court no longer reviews criminal sentences based on “abuse of discretion,” per R.C. §2953.08(G)(2).  As such, Appellant’s sentence was affirmed.

Comments: Sentencing appeals are difficult to win…and any case that contains the words “copious amounts” and “child porn” is probably not a case in which the Appellant is going to garner much sympathy.

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Appellant entered a no contest plea to one count of Attempted Possession of Heroin and one count of Unauthorized use of a Motor Vehicle.

Appellant argued the following assignments of errors:
1) Appellant’s guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing when the trial court failed to inform appellant of the effect of his plea in violation of Crim.R. 11(E).
2) The trial court violated Crim.R. 32(A) by failing to afford appellant the right of allocution.
3) The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing appellant to the maximum term for the offenses.
4) The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed fines. Alternatively, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a hearing on the issue of fines.

So, when you enter a “No Contest” plea, you are not admitting guilt, but you are admitting the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, complaint, or information, and the plea shall not be used against the defendant in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings.

Why is that important?  Because a Trial Court has to tell you this during your plea.  Failure to do so means the plea was not entered knowingly.  Guess what didn’t happen in this case?  …I’m guessing you’ve figured it out already.

The Court reversed and vacated Appellant’s plea, sending it back for them to likely do it correctly the next time.

Comments: This stuff isn’t really that difficult.  Municipal Courts just…get lazy sometimes.  Seriously though; get a script.  Most judges in Common Pleas at one time had a script they read off of if they don’t currently use one still.

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DISCLAIMER: This is my case

Appellant Rodney Geren appealed his sentencing after pleading guilty to one count of burglary and one count of breaking and entering.  The Trial Court sentenced Appellant to 2.5 years.  At sentencing, Appellant also moved to waive costs of prosecution.

Appellant argued the following assignment of error:
1) The Trial Court abused its discretion in assessing court costs to Appellant.

The Court said “Nope,” and affirmed Appellant’s sentence.

Comments: Nothing interesting here.  Nothing on the record anyway.

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Appellant James Long appealed his six month sentence that was run consecutively to a sentence out of Fulton County.

Appellant argued the following assignment of error:
1) The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by not making the required judicial findings before imposing consecutive sentences.

In making consecutive sentences, a Trial Court has to make certain findings.  Specifically that “the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,” and any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

There isn’t anything specific that a Trial Court has to say, but it still has to make these findings in the sentencing entry.

Guess what didn’t – yeah, you’ve probably already figured it out.  The Trial Court didn’t make any of these findings!  That means, the case gets to be sent back for resentencing!

Comments: I rather wish there was an actual consequence for Trial Courts screwing this up so often…it just gets remanded for resentencing, meaning the guy still gets the same sentence…just do it right the first time.  This isn’t difficult…it’s literally copy and pasting words from the statute into the journal entry.  I mean, highlighting text, pressing Ctrl+C and then Ctrl+V is about the easiest set of keyboard commands out there.

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Appellant James Grove appeals his sentence after his conviction for Menacing by Stalking.

Appellant argued the following assignments of error:
1) The trial court erred as a matter of law by imposing conditions of community control that are overbroad, that are not reasonably related to rehabilitation and criminality, and which extend beyond the five-year statutory term limit for community control.
2) The trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to advise appellant of the consequences of violating community control.

The Court goes and lists a number of rather suspicious incidents involving Appellant and the victim.  One specifically being that the victim’s dog just happened to disappear and Appellant just happened to find it, saying he found the dog in once place, and then later saying he found the dog in another place across the city.  Also, his car was seen in the area of the victim’s house at the time the dog “disappeared.”  Oh, and Appellant is “skilled in opening locked doors without keys.” (quote from the opinion).

…yeah…

The Trial Court ordered a mental health assessment.  Appellant took exception to this.  The Court said “No, that’s perfectly fine, based on the record which…I mean, look at it.”  Also, the Trial Court did clearly list the consequences to Appellant of what could happen if he violated the probation conditions placed on him.

Comments: I mean…he’s skilled at picking locks.  I legitimately fear for this victim’s safety reading the facts of this case.

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Appellant Randall Hildebrand appealed his conviction for Failure to Register, a felony of the third degree.  For anyone not in Ohio, that’s being on the sex offender registry, and failing to register as required by the courts.

Appellant entered a guilty plea and the State recommended a two year prison sentence.  The Trial Court sentenced Appellant to two years in prison. 

This is an Anders case.

Appellant’s appointed counsel proposed the following potential assignments of error:
1) Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United States and Ohio constitutions.
2) Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law.

The Court found neither of these to have any merit to them, and granted appointed counsel permission to withdraw, affirming Appellant’s sentence.

Comments: Sentencing appeals…likely a huge percentage of Anders cases.

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Appellant Jordan Byrd appealed his eight year prison sentence after his convictions for two counts of Rape.

Appellant argued the following assignment of error:
1) The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by not making the required judicial findings before imposing consecutive sentences.

…this doesn’t sound familiar at all…

So!  This case is just like State v. Long covered above with one difference; the Trial Court made the correct findings on the record…it just…forgot to put them in its journal entry.  Finding that they’ve dealt with this before, the Court remanded the case to the Trial Court for the sole purpose of amending its journal entry to do just that.

Comments: More copy and pasting problems.  At least this time the Trial Court put stuff on the record…

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Appellant Deangelo Gott appealed a number of judgments from the Trial Court, including granting the State a continuance of the trial date, denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss, and denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea.

Appellant was charged with Robbery, Aggravated Robbery, and two Felonious Assaults, all with firearm specifications.

Appellant was at a party in a basement of a house.  When the owner returned and asked everyone to leave, the party goers started singing gang songs and became more rowdy.  As they dispersed, one person was punched in the face, pushed to the floor, and assaulted, with his money, cellphone, and shoes all being taken.  After that, he was shot in both legs.  A second victim was shot in the chest at close range.  In some act of divine intervention, neither victim died.  Both victims identified Appellant from a photo array.

At a trial date on September 16, 2013, the State admitted it was having difficulty getting the cooperation of the victims.  The prosecution indicated it was reason to proceed but it asked for a continuance, citing that one of the defense attorneys had a conflict.  All of the defense lawyers objected and moved to dismiss for want of prosecution, stating they were all ready for trial.  The Trial Court granted the continuance.

On the next trial date, the State dismissed cases against Appellant’s co-defendants and Appellant’s case proceeded to trial.  However, after jury voir dire, Appellant entered a guilty plea to Robbery and Felonious Assault.  Soon after this, Appellant hired new counsel, and that counsel filed a motion to withdraw Appellant’s plea.  The Trial Court held a two day hearing on the motion before denying it on March 3, 2014.

Appellant raised the following assignments of error:
1) The trial court abused its discretion in denying Gott’s motion to vacate his plea because it was not the product of an intelligent, calculated decision.
2) The trial court erred in imposing a fourteen year sentence, which is nearly a maximum, consecutive sentence.

If you enter a plea, you don’t have the absolute right to withdraw your plea after doing so.  Trial Courts are encouraged to grant these motions liberally.  This is within the Trial Court’s discretion and is not reversed without a finding that the Trial Court abused that discretion.  A change of heart or a mistaken belief about entering a plea is an insufficient reason to withdraw a plea.

Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea, the formerly retained counsel testified that he believed the case against Appellant would not likely proceed due to the non-cooperation of the victims.  He admitted that he didn’t interview any other witnesses listed in the discovery turned over by the State.  Counsel also admitted that he did not file a motion to suppress the photo identification, despite the detective who made the array also administering it.

The Court found that the Trial Court erred in finding that Appellant had not proclaimed his innocence.  The Court’s holding says that simply by entering a guilty plea as coached by your lawyer does not mean that you cannot believe you are innocent.  Also, the Court took issue with the Trial Court’s finding that Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel by not fully investigating the case before trial, finding that any trial strategy formed from his limited investigation would be unreasonable.  (This is the first time I’ve ever seen this line in an appellate case, but there’s case citations so it’s clearly been said before).

The Court found that the ineffective assistance rendered by counsel who represented Appellant at the time of the plea outweighed the prejudice to the State and vacated Appellant’s plea.

Comments: Wow…a big win here for the defense side for sure.  Really, I don’t understand the unwillingness of some Courts to deny motions to withdraw pleas, especially if filed mere weeks after the original plea.  If the guy wants to take it to trial, let him take it to trial, especially when new counsel comes in and immediately files the motion.

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DISCLAIMER: I was involved in writing the brief in this case.

Appellant Jordan Lentz appealed the Trial Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.  Specifically, several white pills found on Appellant’s person after a search resulting from a traffic stop.

Appellant raised the following assignment of error:
1) The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.

…surprising, right?

So, one day, Appellant went into a bar and then exited the bar mere minutes later, got back into his car in a rushed fashion, and then drove off.  This bar was being monitored for drug activity.  Detectives watching the bar ordered uniformed officers to pull Appellant over.  Despite testifying that they have only seen drug deals happen outside of the bar and saw nothing of what happened inside the bar, police still pulled Appellant over.  Police also did not see Appellant any criminal or traffic offenses.

This is as far as the Court got.  The Court found that officers had no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify stopping Appellant’s vehicle.  As such, the Court found that the motion to suppress should have been granted.

Comments: What the Court didn’t get into is what happened after the stop.  We made this whole argument about consent to search with like five police officers standing around, two with black face masks and that Appellant was not free to leave at the time he was asked to be searched.  The Court declined to address any of it since it found that the stop was unlawful in the first place.  The fact pattern of this case is rather worth reading, but there’s not a ton of legal analysis here.

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Assignments of error:
None identified

From the opinion: “Nevertheless, in her brief, she questions whether it is just for the trial court to dismiss her appeal on a technicality when she is doing the best that she can as a pro se litigant, and in light of the fact that our justice system has a liberal notice pleading policy.  Based on appellant’s argument, we construe that she is assigning as error the trial court’s retraction of permission to amend her pleading, and the court’s dismissal of her appeal.”

Result: Affirmed

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Appellant Damien Flowers appeals his sentence after being convicted of Robbery, a felony of the third degree.

Specifically, Appellant asserted the following assignments of error:
1) The trial court committed plain error to the prejudice of Appellant at sentencing by imposing financial sanctions without consideration of Appellant’s present or future ability to pay.
2) Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §10 of the Constitution of the State of Ohio.

If you don’t make a motion to waive costs at sentencing, you waive the issue for the mandatory costs assessed in criminal cases.  Appellant made no such motion.  The Trial Court also found that Appellant would or could be expected to have the ability to pay the discretionary costs as it’s required to do.

The Court also found that, even if Counsel had objected, it would have been unlikely for the Trial Court to waive the costs.

Comments: Not much here.  Costs arguments are the last resort before Anders most of the time.

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Man…that was way too many cases. 

Thursday, March 12, 2015

Cases from March 6, 2015

Cases from March 6, 2015

Welcome back fellow readers and litigators.  The Ohio Sixth District released some cases this week, so let’s go see just how many they…oh goodness, it’s eleven…and over half of them are not criminal cases.  Oh boy…

Little late this week.  I had two briefs to file by Wednesday so this had to take a back seat.  I also start my vacation this week, so I’m going to try and make my descriptions a bit shorter…I’m gonna miss a lot of the finer details, but, hey, we’re trying something new…

Cases this week:

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Before I begin, I want to direct your attention to the case numbers above.  I wasn’t about to write this all out, but that isn’t three numbers; that’s 14-026 THROUGH 14-084.  There are SIXTY cases represented here.

Why are there sixty cases in this decision?  Well, because Appellant, Martin Termmel was convicted after a jury trial of sixty counts of “Failing to Comply with the Kelleys Island Zoning Inspector.”

This case is a story about a fence post.  A few of them actually.  All of them built on the property of Appellant.  However, Appellant lives in a “Environmental Protection Overlay District.”   What is a EPOD you ask?   Well it’s…a place you can’t build any fence, wall, or hedge over 4.5 feet tall.  The EPOD is defined as “the areas in the village 125 feet from the natural shoreline, and that word “natural” is important.  Kelleys Island defines “natural shoreline” as the “ordinary high water elevation of 573.4 feet.”

In 2011, Appellant began constructing a fence, erecting posts that were about ten feet tall.  An inspector came out and told him “Hey, get a building permit because you’re not allowed to do this.”  Appellant did not believe he was required to because he had an existing fence due to a natural hedge.

Appellant filed for a permit.  It was granted with the exception that Appellant had to remove the existing posts and construct only a 4.5 foot tall fence.  Appellant appealed repeatedly, including to the Erie County Common Pleas Court via an administrative appeal, all were denied.  Appellant did not remove the posts.  In 2013, the Inspector sent a letter to Appellant to remove the posts.  Instead, Appellant filed for a zoning permit to construct a six foot fence.  That request was denied and came with another order from the Inspector to remove the posts.  Appellant did not.

Failure to correct violations constitutes a misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and each day is a separate offense.  Between May 7 through July 5, Appellant received 60 violations.  The case proceeded to a Jury Trial which found Appellant guilty of all 60.

Appellant raised the following assignments of error:
1) The trial court erred when it denied Tremmel’s motion to dismiss.
2) The trial court erred when it denied Tremmel’s timely request for essential findings of fact in support of trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
3) The trial court erred when it refused to admit evidence regarding selective enforcement of zoning regulations.
4) The trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury regarding selective enforcement of zoning regulations.
5) The trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury regarding the zoning code that defendant was alleged to have violated.
6) The trial court erred when it failed to admit copies of the code sections from the Kelleys Island zoning code.
7) The trial court’s answer to a question from the jury during deliberations was erroneous and prejudicial which constituted an abuse of discretion and an error of law warranting a new trial.
8) The trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Ohio Crim.R. 29(A) and (C).
9) The trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion for a new trial.
10) The jury verdict and the subsequent judgment entry finding defendant guilty of violating section 152.067 of the Kelley’s Island Zoning Code were against the manifest weight of the evidence, insufficient as a matter of law, or contrary to law.
11) The trial court’s judgment of sentence was against the manifest weight of the evidence, insufficient as a matter of law, or contrary to law.

Going to be honest here…there’s 11 assignments of errors and none of them are really worth going all that indepth over.  Many of these make duplicate or similar arguments.  I mean, he argued that they Trial Court didn’t let him submit copies of the zoning code as evidence, despite the Trial Court instructing the jury on the law; argued selective enforcement despite the Inspector being rather restrained before filing complaints…at the end of the decision, the Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions.

Comments: I…am not a fan of the arguments in this case. I like making off the wall arguments, sure; just ask the Lucas County Prosecutors.  Still, having that kind of a list of assignments of errors over zoning violations…I don’t know about that.

…all over a fence…

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Appellant Michael Yost appeals the granting of Summary Judgment against him in his employment discrimination and retaliation action against the City of Sandusky.

Appellant, a former Sandusky Firefighter, was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease.  A few years after disclosing this to his chief, others started noticing some changes in Appellant’s gait, Appellant appeared to have less energy, etc.  An assistant chief made notes from 2008 to 2011.  In 2008, Appellant was placed on administrative leave pending a physical exam.  Appellant was returned to active duty following the exam.  This kept happening over and over until 2010 when a doctor said that Appellant was unable to perform the duties of his position.  Appellant had already filed an action in 2009 alleging “regarded as disabled” disability discrimination and retaliation for engaging in protected activity.

Sometime in 1991, Appellant was promoted to Battalion Chief.  However, in 2010, the position was eliminated and Appellant was moved to the next highest rank, Captain.

During the suit, Appellees filed for Summary Judgment. Appellant replied untimely and his response was stricken from the record.  Appellant voluntarily dismissed his suit, refiling it in 2013.  Appellee again filed for Summary Judgment.  The Trial Court granted the motion, finding no genuine issues of fact in dispute and that Appellee’s reliance on doctor examinations and recommendations prohibited the lawsuit from prevailing.

Appellant raised the following assignments of error:
1) The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on plaintiff-appellant’s “regarded as disabled” disability discrimination claim.
2) The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on plaintiff-appellant’s retaliation claim.
3) The trial court abused its discretion by imposing discovery sanctions without a hearing.
4) The trial court abused its discretion by imposing an unreasonable attorney fee sanction.

The Court disagreed with Appellant’s arguments on assignments of error 1 and 2, finding that Appellees acted appropriately.

Assignments 3 and 4 go to sanctions…that were given in the first, now dismissed case.  Appellant tried to appeal those orders over a year later and in a different case.  Surprising to no one, the Court was having none of that.

The Trial Court was affirmed.

Comments: Parkinson’s is no fun.  My Pastor has been diagnosed with it too.  That being said…I think there’s just a bit of stubbornness involved in this case.

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Appellant E. Dean Soltesz appealed the granting of a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order against him, in favor of Appellee, his sister.  Appellee alleged that Appellant had been harassing her since 2007 and the harassment originated regarding their father’s probate estate, and included Appellant contacting her current neighbor, her ex-husband, her ex-boyfriend, various family members, and the pastor of her church, to falsely accuse her of adultery.  Appellee also alleged that Appellant damaged her character so badly on the internet that it was hard for her to gain employment in her small community.

Serving the Petition for a CPO was rather difficult; the Sherriff tried twice, a certified letter went unclaimed, leading the Trial Court to deliver the letter by ordinary US Mail.  The letter was returned marked “failure of delivery.”  The notation was hand written and was not endorsed by the Post Office.  With the returned letter was a note from a “concerned U.S. citizen” who claimed he or she received the letter and opened it by accident.  Upon realizing this, he or she contacted an attorney who suggested they write “failure of delivery” on it and return it to the Post Office.  The Trial Court originally entered a CPO on April 17, however, despite finding that Appellant was properly served, the Trial Court found excusable neglect as to why Appellant did not appear for the hearing and vacated the ruling, and scheduled a new full hearing on May 15, 2014.

At the hearing both Appellant and Appellee appeared pro se.  Appellant still objected to the lack of service of the petition and then the parties testified.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Trial Court issued the CPO.

Appellant, acting pro se, raised the following assignments of error…(I normally format these, but…I have no idea how to make these make any sense, so…I’m just copying them verbatim):
I. The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the person, and jurisdiction of process of service, when it held the special hearing of May 15, 2014 due to:
A) The petition in the case having been filed on December 12, 2012,
B) Failure of petitioner to provide service of petition within six months to petitioner under Civ.R. 4(E) without good cause shown, and accordingly any judgment issued against defendant was void ab initio.
II. The domestic relations court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction as well as failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted to issue the CPO resulting from:
A) Petitioner’s admission that defendant had not inflicted any physical harm on her
B) Hearsay of alleged slanderous statements about petitioner allegedly made by defendant to:
1) Family members of the parties
2) The next-door neighbor of the petitioner
3) The ex-husband of the petitioner
C) Said statements allegedly had caused her mental and emotional harm, which she claimed fulfilled the statutory requirement for “stalking,” and
D) The witnesses to whom those statements were allegedly made were unavailable for the hearing, because petitioner alleged she did not have enough time to subpoena them for the May 15, 2014 hearing.
III. The trial court lacked jurisdiction of process to not permit defendant to provide qualifications in explanation to the “yes or no” answers to any allegations against him in the petition under threat of contempt denied (sic) him his right to present evidence in testimony and rebuttal, and his right to present a defense as required for a fair hearing.
IV. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the defendant, when it failed to take judicial notice of his Exhibit A, a copy of the notice of hearing of April 17, 2011 for a “pre-trial” hearing in the guardianship and land sale cases, involving their dad proving that petitioner failed to list on the petition all present and pertinent past court cases she has been involved in with the defendant, proving she violated ORC 2921.11, when she signed and filed the petition.
V. The trial court lacked jurisdiction of process to issue any CPO against defendant due to the court’s restricting defendant’s right (sic) exercise his duty to provide grounds for his objections under threat of holding him in contempt of court for any thing (sic) other than “yes or no” answers.
VI. The domestic relations court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear matters contained in the petition, which originated from the jurisdiction of the probate court under ORC 2111.14(A)(2), ORC 2101.24(A)(1)(g), (m), (n), (o), (q), (s), (t), (w), (bb), (cc), (dd); and (2).
VII. The trial court abused its discretion to the prejudice of respondent in taking the testimony of the petitioner over the denials of the allegations by the defendant, when it issued the CPO.
VIII. The trial court was without jurisdiction in holding the hearing below, and subsequently issuing the CPO as a form of retaliation against defendant for conducting an investigation as to whether the probate judge has been concealing the fact that a hearing record is truly available for appellate review in the related probate cases.

…yeah…

So, service by mail is considered delivered upon mailing unless Postal Officials return the envelope with an endorsement showing failure of delivery.  Amazingly, THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE ANONYMOUS HANDWRITTEN NOTES. 

Appellant argued that the Trial Court was unfair by forcing him to respond with only “Yes” or “No” to the Trial Court’s questions.  As it turns out, Appellant liked to interrupt everyone, and was also given the chance to present his own testimony without interruption. 

I’m not going to go much further with this case.  All I’m going to do is quote the decision directly with this:

“Following the presentation of his testimony, appellant then stated that he was reserving his right to present the matter to a jury, stated that he was not provided an opportunity to be represented by counsel, inquired whether the proceedings were being conducted under admiralty and maritime law, requested either a cease and desist order against appellee or a dismissal of the case, and objected to the court issuing a civil protection order because it gives the impression that the trial court is retaliating against appellant for investigating the actions of the probate court in allegedly concealing an entire hearing record in appellant’s father’s guardianship proceedings “

As a side note, and I’ve never actually seen this before, the Court copied and pasted Appellant’s entire argument as to Assignment of Error #8 and stated, basically “We cannot find any procedural error identified in this argument.”

The Trial Court was affirmed.

Comments: This sounds like a pro se that has a lot of fun filings to read…

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So, how’s this for a nutshell: Appellant Mr. Reeves appealed the dismissal of his petition for divorce.  You have to reside in the State for at least six months prior to the filing of the petition.  Appellant had a Florida address listed on his complain for himself.

The Trial Court dismissed for not having Subject Matter Jurisdiction.  The Court affirmed.

Comments: Another Pro Se Appellant.  Wouldn’t it just have been easier to just…file another petition?

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Another mortgage case…

This case is full of contract terms like “accord and satisfaction” and “consideration.”  Any law student reading this just shuddered in fear. 

Basically, Appellant made partial payments in 2009 and stopped making payments in 2010, and Appellee Bank foreclosed for an amount over $100,000 in 2012.  Appellant tried to argue that the payments in 2009-2010 were made according to a second mortgage agreement and were accepted by Appellee Bank as full satisfaction of the mortgage.  The Trial Court said “no.”  The Court affirmed.

There’s a bit of an interesting bit in here that you can only have “consideration” which is a required part of a contract, for partial payments on a mortgage IF those payments are being made over the threat of declaring bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy was never an issue in this case.

Comments: This decision is only 9 pages and I understand basically none of it…

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Appellant Edward Meifert, III appealed the Trial Court’s decision after a trial on a complaint and counterclaim for divorce.  In the judgment, the trial court granted the parties a divorce, awarded separate property and divided marital property. The judgment also awarded appellant spousal support in the amount of $400 per month for a period of 120 months, subject to earlier termination on stated conditions.

These two were married in 1978 and separated in August 2012.  The parties have three children who are now adults.  Both parties testified that they are incompatible and requested termination of the marriage.

Appellant raised the following arguments on appeal:
1) The trial court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support to the plaintiff-appellee.
2) The trial court improperly imputed income to the defendant-appellant or failed in its calculation of earning abilities of the parties.
3) The trial court improperly computed the division of marital property.
4) The findings and decision of the court are against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant tried to claim that his income was $20,462 in 2011, $16,000 in 2010, and $9,936 in 2009 and that all the income was derived from his construction work.  The Trial Court found that at least $34,000 in income in 2010 had gone unreported based on Appellee’s testimony and evidence.  Appellant kept no business records and claimed self-employment.

The Court found no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s determination of spousal support.

The Court also found no abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s determination of the asset split and that the final judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.  The Trial Court was affirmed.

Comments:  I basically stay out of Domestic Relations Court because of divorces like this…or in general…

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Appellant Walter D. Rodela and Appellee divorced in 1995.  At the time, the Trial Court awarded Appellee $12,500 plus growth out of Appellant’s retirement package.

Appellant retired and gave Appellee $11,656.25 from the fund, which represented the amount ordered minus taxes and the growth.  Appellant filed a motion to show cause in the Trial Court.

At a hearing, William Kimmelman, an expert in the division of pension assets in divorce cases, testified that he did not have the statements from S&P 500 Index to approximate the actual amount of growth in the fund, but based on his experience, a return rate between four to six percent was appropriate.  Kimmelman admitted that he had not seen an investment portfolio for any of the years between 1995 and 2010.  Also, in 1995, the Ohio Public Employees Deferred Compensation Program was not actually able to segregate funds, despite the divorce decree’s order to do so.

Appellant was held in contempt for failure to follow the divorce decree by a magistrate.  However, the Trial Court modified the magistrate’s order finding Appellant in contempt, but upheld the magistrate’s finding that Appellant had not paid the correct share of the fund.

Appellant asserted the following assignment of error:
The lump sum award is not supported by competent, credible evidence.

Can you see this one coming?  Maybe?  Guess what?  You have to actually know what you’re talking about when you testify to something…who knew?

The Court reversed the Trial Court’s finding and remanded for a new hearing on the issue of what the growth in the fund actually was.

Comments: “Ya know, I haven’t looked at a lick of evidence to support my contentions, but X is normal, so it’s clearly got to be X.”  …yeah, that doesn’t work…

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Appellant Angeline Kelly appealed the judgment from the Trial Court, granting Forcible Entry and Detainer to Appellant.

FOR THE NON-LAWYER: “Forcible Entry and Detainer” is basically an eviction and reclaiming of your property.

Appellant had a problem paying rent on time, but the landlord accepted payments late all of the time.  Finally, the final straw had been dropped and Appellee refused to accept another late payment and demanded Appellant move out in 30 days.  Appellant filed for bankruptcy in the Federal Court.

So there’s this thing in the US Code that basically automatically stays any eviction proceeding upon the filing of bankruptcy, unless a judgment against the debtor is obtained prior to the bankruptcy being filed.  You can petition for the Federal Court to remove the stay.  That did not happen here.

The Toledo Municipal Court denied Appellant’s request to stay the case due to the filing of Bankruptcy and gave NO reason for having done so.

The Court said “Yeah…you can’t do that,” and reversed the Trial Court.

Comments: …Appellant was pro se…PRO SE VICTORY!  Woohoo!  Always like knocking the TMC around a bit for things like this…way to go Ms. Kelly.

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Appellant Frederick Harder appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to four counts of Rape, felonies of the first degree, and receiving a sentence of 40 years.

Appellant was originally indicted with 37 counts of rape and 36 counts of sexual battery (and no, there are no typos in those numbers).  That was a 2012 indictment.  More charges were added in a 2013 indictment.

Appellant pled to the four counts and in exchange everything else was dismissed and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of no more than 30 years.  The Trial Court did not follow the recommendation and gave Appellant the max it could, 40 years.

Appellant argued the following assignments of error:
1) The appellant was not afforded effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
2) The appellant did not voluntarily and knowingly enter guilty pleas relative to Counts I, II, IV and VI given the plea negotiations agreed upon between the states [sic] and appellant ensured appellant a thirty-year prison sentence rather than the forty-year term imposed by the sentencing court.
3) The appellant’s sentence should be vacated based upon the trial court’s failure to comply with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.

Sentencing appeals are hard to win.  Especially when your client tells the Trial Court “yes, I understand that this Court does not have to abide by the recommendation the State gives it and I understand the max sentence I am facing.”  That happened in this case.

Finding no evidence on the record to indicate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and finding that the Trial Court did properly consider R.C. §2929.11 and R.C. §2929.12, the Court affirmed Appellant’s sentence.

Comments: Sentencing appeals…so hard to win…I’d say impossible in all but the most extreme of circumstances.

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Appellant Christopher Holloway appeals his sentence of 36 months after pleading guilty to possession of cocaine and attempted possession of heroin.

Appellant raised the following assignment of error on appeal:
1) The trial court erred to the prejudice of appellant by not making the required judicial findings before imposing consecutive sentences.

So, in order for a Trial Court to make sentences consecutive to one another, it must make certain findings.  Some of those findings include:
“…the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public…” (R.C. §2929.14(C))

The Court, try as it might, attempted to construe what the Trial Court stated on the record as findings under R.C. §2929.14(C).  However, the Trial Court made absolutely no attempt at finding that consecutive sentences was not disproportionate to the seriousness of Appellant’s conduct.  Without that, the Court was forced to reverse Appellant’s sentence and remand the case for a resentencing.

Comments: …this is rather ironic considering my last comment.  See what I mean about extreme cases?  The Trial Court completely missed a mandated finding for consecutive sentences.  Can’t do that…

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Appellant Douglas Irvin, Jr. appealed his conviction of Perjury after jury trial.  Yes…a jury trial on Perjury…

The case arose out of testimony that occurred at the Wood County Domestic Relations Court.  Appellant was married to Melissa Irvin in 2007.  They divorced in 2011.  In 2013, Ms. Irvin reported to police that Appellant had touched the bare breasts of her older daughter.  During an investigation, Appellant took two polygraph tests.  The first one Appellant could not complete due to being sick, the second he failed.  This was shown on video as, directly after Appellant took the polygraph, the Ohio State Trooper advised Appellant that he failed the test.

Ms. Irvin filed an emergency motion to terminate Appellant’s visitation with their daughter.  Appellant was put under oath and testified “This whole situation goes back to falsehood. I’ve been through the lie detector twice now, passed both times.”  The magistrate denied Ms. Irvin’s motion.  This is the statement the perjury is based on.

Appellant raised the following assignments of error:
1) The trial court erred by failing to grant defendant/appellant’s motion for acquittal under Rule 29 of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2) The trial court erred by refusing to permit the appellant to identify and confront his accuser.
3) The trial court’s sentence of appellant to a near maximum sentence of thirty months was contrary to law and further constituted an abuse of discretion in failing to properly consider and apply the sentencing guidelines set forth in Ohio Revised Code, Sections 2929.11 and 2929.12.

This case really falls on the first assignment of error.  The third is a sentencing argument that goes nowhere, and the second one doesn’t really make much sense.  It appears that Appellant argued that he was not allowed to ask his ex-wife if she brought the perjury charges in order to prove that it was just a method of getting him away from his child, however, the Trial Court proceedings are recorded by a Court Reporter, and he was confronted with the statement he made.  At no point did Appellant argue he did not make the statement.

This case really turned on the elements of perjury.  Perjury is: “No person, in any official proceeding, shall knowingly make a false statement under oath or affirmation, or knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false statement previously made, when either statement is material.” R.C. §2921.11(A)

Appellant argued that, from his point of view, the law enforcement officers were trying to coerce a confession out of him and therefore he, in his mind, must have passed the polygraph test.  Appellant’s argument was that, due to his perceived deception of the officers, he did not believe he had failed the test.  However, the Court found that, looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as it is required to do, the Court found that a reasonable trier of fact could have found that Appellant knowingly made a false statement of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant also argued that the statement was not material as it was made at a hearing that’s primary purpose was to appoint a guardian ad litem post-divorce.  Also, since polygraphs are inadmissible without a stipulation, the results don’t matter.

The Court, however, found that the statement had the potential to bolster Appellant’s credibility at the hearing and influence the magistrate.  Under a light most favorable to the State, the Court found that the statement was material and affirmed Appellant’s conviction.

Comments: I’m rather disappointed in something this petty being prosecuted, but then I see it’s Wood County and I’m not surprised.  I’m also rather disappointed in the outcome.  I think the Court went the wrong way with this, but that’s just my opinion.  I have no idea how an officer can deduce the results of a polygraph considering I’ve sat through some of them before and they normally take weeks to come back with a result, because any reputable test giver sends the test to a blind examiner to verify the results.  Having the officer just say “oh, you failed” immediately after just screams “police tactic” to me. 

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Man…I feel like I just ran a marathon…